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Pick Your Poison: Private Speech, Government
Speech, and the Special Problem of Religious Displays
RonNell Andersen Jones
I. INTRODUCTION
For years, the United States Supreme Court has debated the
constitutionality of a governmental entity erecting or maintaining an
1
arguably religious symbol on public property. A deeply divided and
often inconsistent Court has created significant complexity in this
2
area. It has produced a much-maligned “reindeer rule,” a sometimes
3
difficult-to-decipher “endorsement test,” and, most recently, a pair
of Ten Commandments cases decided in the very same Term that
4
declared that such displays are sometimes constitutional and
5
sometimes not, based on razor-thin distinctions loosely articulated
 Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. The author thanks student researchers Chris Whittaker and Sam Brooks for their
excellent assistance.
1. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU,
545 U.S. 844 (2005); Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984).
2. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668 (holding that a crèche displayed on public property was
not establishing religion because it was surrounded by other secular symbols associated with
Christmas, including model reindeer).
3. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 (Blackmun, J.) (plurality opinion) (adopting Justice
O’Connor’s proposed endorsement test, which asks whether “‘the challenged governmental
action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an
endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices’”
(quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985))). The test has been
frequently criticized for the unpredictability caused by its subjective emphasis. See, e.g., Patrick
M. Garry, A Congressional Attempt to Alleviate the Uncertainty of the Court’s Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence: The Public Expression of Religion Act, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 12 (2006–
07) (“Because the test calls for judges to speculate about the perceptions that unknown people
may have about various religious speech or symbols, its application is inherently uncertain.”).
4. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677. Van Orden upheld a Ten Commandments
monument that was located on the Texas State Capitol lawn. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored
an opinion that was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Rehnquist concluded that
while the Ten Commandments had religious significance, they also had an “undeniable
historical meaning.” Id. at 690. Thus, the monument did not offend the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 691–92. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to detail his
reasons. See infra note 6.
5. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 844. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in
McCreary and was joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer. This time, the
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6

by a single Justice. All told, the Supreme Court’s handling of
7
purportedly sectarian displays has been convoluted at best.
Now it seems that the Court has added yet another unnecessary
8
layer of complexity. The “recently minted” government speech
majority held that a Ten Commandments display within a county courthouse did violate the
Establishment Clause. This finding was based largely on the history of the monument. Id. at
867–74. During a ceremony celebrating the installation of the monument, the Court noted,
the county executive was joined by his pastor, who “testified to the certainty of the existence of
God.” Id. at 869. The monument also lacked, at least initially, any disclaimer that it was placed
in the courthouse for the purpose of celebrating the Ten Commandments’ effect on civil law.
Id. at 868.
6. Justice Breyer famously voted on opposite sides of the two seemingly analogous
cases. In Van Orden, he wrote separately to concur with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy that the monument was not establishing religion, essentially
because (1) the group that donated it had an arguably secular purpose in doing so, (2) it was
surrounded by other secular monuments, and (3) it had been standing forty years and during
that time there had been no objections. 545 U.S. at 701–02 (Breyer, J., concurring). In
McCreary Cnty., Justice Breyer crossed the aisle, joining Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter
and Ginsburg (the dissenters in Van Orden) in finding that the monument was not
permissible, without writing separately. 545 U.S. at 849. The basis for his equivocation, as
articulated in his Van Orden concurrence, was that
the short (and stormy) history of the courthouse Commandments’ displays
demonstrates the substantially religious objectives of those who mounted them, and
the effect of this readily apparent objective upon those who view them. That history
there indicates a governmental effort substantially to promote religion, not simply
an effort primarily to reflect, historically, the secular impact of a religiously inspired
document. And, in today’s world, in a Nation of so many different religious and
comparable nonreligious fundamental beliefs, a more contemporary state effort to
focus attention upon a religious text is certainly likely to prove divisive in a way that
this longstanding, pre-existing monument has not.
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
7. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 717 (9th Cir.
1999), withdrawn on other grounds by Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 192 F.3d
1208 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (characterizing “recent Establishment Clause doctrine” as
“suffer[ing] from a sort of jurisprudential schizophrenia”); Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the
Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 728 (2006)
(characterizing Establishment Clause doctrine as “a hopeless muddle” and arguing that “[a]t
one point or another in recent years, one or more of the nine Justices have signed opinions
proposing ten different standards for enforcing the Establishment Clause”); Roxanne L.
Houtman, ACLU v. McCreary County: Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State, 55
SYRACUSE L. REV. 395, 397 (2005) (“[I]n the past thirty years, the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has become increasingly ambiguous.”); Sarah M. Isgur,
“Play in the Joints”: The Struggle to Define Permissive Accommodation Under the First
Amendment, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 371 (2008) (noting that the court has created
“multiple and overlapping analytical frameworks” in the Establishment Clause arena); Douglas
G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Religious Symbolism After McCreary and Van Orden, 12
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93, 94 (2007) (characterizing the Court’s efforts in McCreary and Van
Orden as “doing little to clarify the law” and “leaving lower courts to sort out the principles
that resulted in such disparate results regarding substantially similar displays”).
8. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
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doctrine, already applied in a variety of other contexts, has in the last
two Terms become almost inextricably intertwined with religious
10
speech and Establishment Clause concerns. The rise of the
government speech doctrine has created a new and exceptionally
sticky relationship between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Speech Clause, and presents a practical quandary that the Court as a
whole has failed to reconcile or even to squarely acknowledge.
11
In the 2009 case of Pleasant Grove City v. Summum and the
12
2010 case of Salazar v. Buono, the Court faced fact patterns that
almost perfectly demonstrate the way in which this complexity is
likely to come to a head in the context of arguably religious displays.
Both of these cases were layered with doctrinal intricacies and intraCourt splits that somewhat obscure this more basic lesson. But when
stripped to their cores, Summum and Buono highlight the tensions
that the Court has produced for itself in this particular corner of the
government-speech arena.
The first case, Summum, involved arguably private speech that
the government endeavored to characterize as government speech in
13
order to avoid a First Amendment Free Speech Clause problem —
and in so doing, potentially created for itself a First Amendment
14
Establishment Clause problem. The second case, Buono, involved
arguably government speech that the government endeavored to
characterize as private speech in order to avoid a First Amendment
15
Establishment Clause problem —and in so doing, potentially
16
created for itself a First Amendment Free Speech Clause problem.
concurring).
9. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (holding that a
government advertising campaign funded by a compelled subsidy on the beef industry was
government speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (holding that the government’s
decision to subsidize family planning services only if they declined to promote or encourage
abortion constituted government speech); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)
(holding that a government employee’s speech made pursuant to official duties constituted
government speech and was not protected by the First Amendment from employer retaliation).
10. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010); Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125.
11. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125.
12. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803.
13. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129.
14. Id. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring).
15. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1836 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the plurality
apparently believed that the land transfer had successfully made a Latin cross private speech,
and thus eliminated any Establishment Clause issue).
16. Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 70, 71
(2009) (noting that the government in Buono, by trying to recharacterize its speech as private,
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This Article will utilize Summum and Buono to highlight the
shared tension that the government speech doctrine creates between
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses. Summum and Buono are
briefly summarized in Parts II and III respectively. Using the cases’
fact patterns as bookend examples of the new doctrinal tensions, the
Article will illustrate the ways in which the Court’s newly developed
government speech doctrine can be expected to interact with and
implicate the Establishment Clause inquiry with potentially troubling
ramifications. Part IV will underscore the practical ramifications of
the Court’s refusal to resolve the tension, and Part V will conclude
by offering early thoughts on how the Court could clarify the
doctrine in a cohesive way.
II. PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM
17

Summum was a suit brought by a religious group against the
City of Pleasant Grove, Utah (“Pleasant Grove”). Pleasant Grove
owns a small park in the town’s historic district, containing more
than a dozen permanent displays and monuments, including a
18
depiction of the Ten Commandments made of granite. As was the
case with a majority of the other displays and monuments in the
19
park, the Ten Commandments monument was purchased, not by
the city directly, but by a private organization that donated it to the
20
city park. In the case of the Ten Commandments monument, the
21
donating group was the Fraternal Order of Eagles, whose donations
of Ten Commandment monuments have featured prominently in
some major Establishment Clause cases, most notably Van Orden v.
22
Perry, which narrowly upheld the display of a Ten Commandments
monument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles on the grounds
23
of the Texas state capital in Austin.
Summum, a very small religious sect with roots in Utah,
approached Pleasant Grove and requested permission to erect its
was making itself vulnerable to a Free Speech claim).
17. See The Purpose and Mission of Summum, SUMMUM: SEALED EXCEPT TO THE
OPEN MIND, http://www.summum.us/about/purpose.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
18. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129.
19. Id. (“These included an historic granary, a wishing well, the City’s first fire station,
[and] a September 11 monument . . . .”).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
23. Id. at 678–79.
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own monument in the park alongside the others. This monument
25
would contain the so-called “Seven Aphorisms of Summum,” a set
of guiding principles that the group said was central to its faith. The
proposed monument would be largely comparable to the Ten
Commandments monument. It would be roughly the same size and
shape, would be made of stone, and would be placed within the city
26
park.
27
Pleasant Grove rejected the request. The city informed
Summum that the park was restricted to donated monuments that
either related directly to the history of the town or were donated by
28
groups with “longstanding ties” to the community, a policy the city
did not have officially in place at the time, but adopted by resolution
29
soon after the rejection of the Aphorisms. After a subsequent
30
request to erect the monument was also denied, Summum sued.
Importantly, for purposes of this analysis, a suit arising out of this
fact pattern could have taken one of any number of forms. Indeed,
the pages of the U.S. Reports are filled with cases in which minority
sects—perhaps recognizing the political and practical barriers
keeping their state or local government from permitting a display
favoring the less prominent religion—sought instead to prohibit that
state or local government from using a display to give the appearance
31
32
of favoring a majority faith. In Van Orden, litigants with
24. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30.
25. Id. at 1129; See Seven Summum Principles, SUMMUM: SEALED EXCEPT TO THE
OPEN MIND, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml (last visited Jan. 31,
2011) (“Summum is mind; the universe is a mental creation”; “As above, so below; as below,
so above”; “Nothing rests; everything moves; everything vibrates”; “Everything is dual;
everything has an opposing point; everything has its pair of opposites; like and unlike are the
same; opposites are identical in nature, but different in degree; extremes bond; all truths are
but partial truths; all paradoxes may be reconciled”; “Everything flows out and in; everything
has its season; all things rise and fall; the pendulum swing expresses itself in everything; the
measure of the swing to the right is the measure of the swing to the left; rhythm
compensates”; “Every cause has its effect; every effect has its cause; everything happens
according to Law; Chance is just a name for Law not recognized; there are many fields of
causation, but nothing escapes the Law of Destiny”; “Gender is in everything; everything has
its masculine and feminine principles; Gender manifests on all levels.”).
26. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30.
27. Id. at 1130.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058 (2001) (mem.) (denying certiorari for
two plaintiffs, one of whom was an avowed atheist, who sued for the removal of a Ten
Commandments Monument from the lawn of a city municipal building); Lynch v. Donnelly,
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objections to the exact display at issue in Summum—a Ten
Commandments display gifted to a government by the Fraternal
Order of Eagles—had challenged the monument as violative of the
Establishment Clause and argued that its removal was
33
constitutionally required. In fact, in earlier cases, the Summum sect
itself had challenged other Utah municipalities’ decisions to erect
Ten Commandments displays in public places on Establishment
34
Clause grounds, arguing that the government’s decision to display
the Judeo-Christian tenets “violate[d] the church’s First Amendment
35
right to be free from an establishment of religion” and demanding
36
that the monument be removed.
But in Summum, the sect’s first choice was not to have the Ten
Commandments monument taken down; it was to have its own
monument erected. Thus, it framed its suit not as an Establishment
37
Clause case, but as a Free Speech Clause case, arguing that Pleasant
Grove’s decision to include some monuments while excluding the
Summum display was unconstitutional because, having created a
public forum and opened the forum to private speech like that of the
Fraternal Order of Eagles, the city could not discriminatorily exclude
38
other private speech.
The district court denied Summum’s request for a preliminary
39
injunction directing the city to allow its monument in the park, but
465 U.S. 668 (1984) (plaintiffs, including one with a Jewish background, Donnelly v. Lynch,
525 F. Supp. 1150, 1157 (D.R.I. 1981), sued for the removal of a crèche that was part of their
city’s annual Christmas display); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (plaintiffs,
including a Quaker, a Unitarian, and a Jewish Rabbi, sued to overturn a law mandating the
posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms).
32. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
33. Id. at 682.
34. Summum v. City of Ogden, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (D. Utah 2001), rev’d,
Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002), abrogated by, Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997).
35. Ogden, 297 F.3d at 998.
36. Id.
37. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30.
38. Id.; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985) (holding that in a public forum restrictions on speech that are content based are
impermissible unless they satisfy strict scrutiny); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
96 (1972) (“[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views. . . . Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government
may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to
say.”).
39. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, No. 2:05CV00638, 2006 WL 3421838, at *2
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed,
accepting Summum’s characterization of the speech in question and
40
then agreeing with its Free Speech Clause analysis. Because the park
was a traditional public forum, and because the city was denying a
private speaker access to the forum based on the content of that
speaker’s speech, the city’s action was unconstitutional absent a
compelling interest that could not be served by more narrowly
41
tailored means and Summum was entitled to an injunction.
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that
42
Pleasant Grove had not acted unconstitutionally. It reached this
holding not because it disagreed that the public forum doctrine
43
prohibits governments from discriminating against private speakers,
but because it declined to view the plot line of the case through the
public-forum-private-speaker lens that Summum had urged, and
44
instead adopted Pleasant Grove’s government-speech narrative. The
Ten Commandments monument, the city had argued, was not
properly characterized as private speech because it was a donated gift
from the Fraternal Order of Eagles. When the City permitted
privately donated monuments to be erected in the park, those
monuments changed in character, and became the government’s

(D. Utah Nov. 22, 2006).
40. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1055, 1057 (10th Cir. 2007),
rev’d, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125.
41. Id. at 1053–54. Judges Lucero and McConnell dissented from a subsequent order
denying rehearing en banc. Judge Lucero agreed that the monument was private speech, but
argued that a park is not a traditional public forum when the access sought is the permanent
installation of a monument rather than “in-person” dissemination of ideas. Summum v.
Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 2007) (Lucero, J., dissenting). By
allowing monuments in the park, he reasoned, Pleasant Grove had opened a limited public
forum, and thus could reasonably control access to it based on content. Id. at 1173–74. Judge
McConnell took a government-speech approach. He argued that, based on Tenth Circuit
precedent, the Ten Commandments monument was government speech because Pleasant
Grove owned the monument, exercised total control over it, and bore ultimate responsibility
for its contents and upkeep. Id. at 1176–77 (McConnell, J., dissenting). Furthermore, when
Pleasant Grove “accepted donation of the monument[] and displayed [it] on public land, the
cit[y] embraced the message[] as [its] own.” Id. at 1177. Once the monument is characterized
as government speech, he argued, the forum analysis is unnecessary. Id. Instead, “[t]he
government may adopt whatever message it chooses—subject, of course, to other
constitutional constraints, such as those embodied in the Establishment Clause—and need not
alter its speech to accommodate the views of private parties.” Id.
42. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138.
43. Id. at 1132.
44. Id. at 1138.
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own expressive conduct: “Just as government-commissioned and
government-financed monuments speak for the government, so do
privately financed and donated monuments that the government
46
accepts and displays to the public on government land.” Thus, the
city, in accepting the permanent monument from Fraternal Order of
Eagles and displaying it in its park, changed the character of the
47
monument from private speech to government speech.
The consequence of this recharacterization was not small. As the
Summum Court boldly stated, the Free Speech Clause “has no
48
application” to government speech. Having cast the monuments
into the “government speech” box, the city was free to choose
among monuments the same way that any other private speaker was
49
free to choose to share or not share a message. By classifying the
speech in question as its own government speech, Pleasant Grove
had won.
Looming large over this Free Speech Clause win, however, was
the Establishment Clause question that the plaintiff, in crafting its
claim, had opted not to ask. After all, the message that the
government of Pleasant Grove had fought so hard to have declared
as its own was a core set of Judeo-Christian religious tenets—a
message that, when adopted too fully as their own, has been the
50
constitutional downfall of government entities in numerous cases.

45. Id. at 1134.
46. Id. at 1133.
47. Id. at 1134.
48. Id. at 1131 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 1131–32. Although the Court emphasized that “it frequently is not possible
to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure,” id. at 1136, and that
by accepting a monument, “a government entity does not necessarily endorse the specific
meaning that any particular donor sees in the monument,” id., it nevertheless decided that the
message of the monument, whatever it might be, was the government’s. Id. at 1138.
“Government decisionmakers select the monuments that portray what they view as appropriate
for the place in question, taking into account such content-based factors as esthetics, history,
and local culture. The monuments that are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have
the effect of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute government speech.”
Id. at 1134.
50. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980) (per curiam); see Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599–600 (1989)
(holding that the display of a crèche in a county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause,
in part because it sat in the “‘main’ and ‘most beautiful part’ of the building,” such that the
reasonable observer must assume that the government intended to adopt the message (internal
citation omitted)).
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Justice Alito’s majority opinion does not once address this
51
quandary. Plainly, however, the issue was not wholly lost on the
Justices, as the nascent Establishment Clause problem was a primary
52
focus of oral argument questioning in Summum, and was addressed
in several concurring opinions. Justice Souter’s concurrence noted
that “there [was] no doubt that this case and its government speech
claim [were] litigated by the parties with one eye on the
53
Establishment Clause.” In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens
insinuated that he thought the Ten Commandments display in the
Pleasant Grove park might well fall afoul of the Establishment
Clause, noting that “the effect of today’s decision will be limited”
because “even if the Free Speech Clause neither restricts nor protects
government speech, government speakers are bound by the
Constitution’s other proscriptions, including . . . the Establishment
54
. . . Clause[ ].” Conversely, Justice Scalia wrote separately to agree
that “the case [had] been litigated in the shadow of the First
55
Amendment’s Establishment Clause,” but to opine, on behalf of
himself and Justice Thomas, that Pleasant Grove had not, in fact,
gone out of “the Free Speech Clause frying pan [and] into the
51. Although noting in passing that the government-speech doctrine “does not mean
that there are no restraints on government speech” and then amplifying that, “[f]or example,
government speech must comport with the Establishment Clause,” Summum, 129 S. Ct. at
1131–32, the opinion never once acknowledges that this restraint at least arguably applies to
the City of Pleasant Grove in the very speech at issue.
52. Justice Kennedy noted, “[I]t does seem to me that if you say it’s Government
speech that in later cases, including the case of the existing monument, you’re going to say it’s
Government speech and you have an Establishment Clause problem.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 5, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-665). Justice
Souter also commented on the tension: “[T]hat would satisfy you, and it would also be the
poison pill in the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 63. Chief Justice Roberts’ very first question
was directed at it: “[T]he more you say that the monument is Government speech to get out
of the . . . Free Speech Clause, the more it seems to me you’re walking into a trap under the
Establishment Clause. If it’s Government speech, it may not present a free speech problem, but
what is the government doing speaking—supporting the Ten Commandments?” Id. at 4.
Justice Ginsburg likewise suggested that the Establishment Clause element of the case was not
resolved by Van Orden: “Because you don’t have here a 40-year history of this monument
being there, and nobody seems to be troubled by it.” Id. at 7; see also id. at 47 (Justice Scalia:
“You will say just the opposite when you come back here to challenge the Ten
Commandments monument on—on Establishment Clause grounds. You will say something
like this: Anybody who comes into this park and seeing this monument owned by the
Government, on Government land, will think that the Government is endorsing this
message.”).
53. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring).
55. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
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56

Establishment Clause fire.” Under these two Justices’ reading of
the Van Orden and McCreary County precedents, there was “little
basis to distinguish the monument in this case” from the Ten
57
Commandments monument that passed constitutional muster, and
58
thus, they speculated, Pleasant Grove could survive the next case.
Neither of these views, of course, represents a holding from the
Court, or even the position of a majority of Justices. And thus,
Pleasant Grove was left only to surmise as to what consequence
would result from its fervent efforts to characterize the arguably
religious speech as its own, unsure whether it had picked its First
59
Amendment poison. Other governmental entities, whose decisions
about monuments might be even closer calls under the Court’s
discordant and sometimes imprecise Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, would be at an even greater loss in speculating
whether characterizing that speech as government speech for
purposes of the Free Speech litigation would prove to be the critical
evidence in a later case alleging that they had unconstitutionally
established religion.
III. SALAZAR V. BUONO
While Summum set off a firestorm of discussion about what the
government speech doctrine might now mean and how it might be
60
invoked in future cases, the case illustrated only one half of the
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1140.
58. Id.
59. At least one district court judge agrees with Justice Scalia. On remand to the Utah
district court, Summum was given leave to amend its complaint to include an Establishment
Clause claim. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, No. 2:05CV638, 2010 WL 2330336, at *1
(D. Utah June 03, 2010). The district court held that the monument did not establish
religion. Id. at *3. Citing Justice Scalia’s concurrence, and relying on Van Orden, the court
concluded that, “The undisputed facts of record in this case show that—whatever the Eagles’
intended message—Pleasant Grove has, since the beginning, displayed the monument for
reasons of history, not religion.” Id.
60. Blake R. Bertagna, The Government’s Ten Commandments: Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum and the Government Speech Doctrine, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (2009); Joseph Blocher,
Property and Speech in Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 83 (2009); Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the
New Wars of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23 (2010);
Bruce Ledewitz, Could Government Speech Endorsing a Higher Law Resolve the Establishment
Clause Crisis?, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 41 (2009); Daniel W. Park, Government Speech and the
Public Forum: A Clash Between Democratic and Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113
(2009–2010); Lisa Shaw Roy, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: Monuments, Messages, and the
Next Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 280 (2010); Tebbe, supra note 16; L. Darnell
Weeden, A First Amendment Establishment Clause Analysis of Permanent Displays on Public
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larger Free Speech/Establishment tug-of-war. Summum had given
reason for concern that governments that adopted speech as their
own for Free Speech Clause litigation purposes might come to regret
the decision if faced with Establishment Clause litigation, but
61
Salazar v. Buono’s facts—if not its holding—illustrated the
opposite: governments that take pains to distance themselves from
speech for Establishment Clause purposes might create practical
difficulties for themselves in the Free Speech area.
62
Argued just eight months after Summum was decided, Buono
was a case with a complex procedural posture and a somewhat
constricted question presented. But the facts that produced the
dispute parallel those in Summum in some important ways. Again,
63
the Court was faced with an arguably religious monument, again
64
65
donated by a private entity, again displayed on public park land.
Indeed, the fuller history of the case demonstrates that the challenge
against this arguably religious display was sparked, at least initially,
not by a plaintiff who was seeking for the government to stop
engaging in religious speech but by an adherent of a less prominent
66
religion whose request for a monument was rejected.
In Buono, the display was a white Latin cross made of piping and
67
standing between 5 and 8 feet in height. The cross has stood for
more than seven decades on a visible outcropping of rock in the
federally owned land of the massive Mojave National Preserve in
68
southeastern California. Perched on a ledge called Sunrise Rock,
the cross can be seen from all around, including from the road that
69
passes through the Preserve, which is about 100 feet away. The
cross has been on Sunrise Rock since the Veterans of Foreign Wars
initially built it in the 1930s, apparently as a “donated” memorial to
70
mark the sacrifices of World War I soldiers, although it has been
Property as Government Speech, 35 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 217 (2010).
61. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
62. Summum was decided February 25, 2009. Buono was argued October 7, 2009.
63. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811–12.
64. Id. at 1812.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1833 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202,
1205–06 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also discussion infra accompanying notes 77–79.
67. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811–12.
68. Id. at 1811.
69. Id. at 1812.
70. Id. at 1811.
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put to at least some religious use, including regular Easter services.
While the cross has existed on government property for decades and
has even been replaced by private entities over the years as it
72
deteriorated in the weather, the government apparently never gave
explicit permission for it to be erected, maintained, or located on the
73
federal land. It also never took the fairly easy step of chopping it
down, arguably because doing so would appear disrespectful to the
74
veterans in whose honor it initially was constructed.
The challenge to the cross that eventually came before the
United States Supreme Court was a complicated one, tied to a piece
75
of congressional legislation and brought by a former parks
supervisor whose standing was questionable in the eyes of at least
76
some of the Justices. But at earlier stages in the story, the tale
almost perfectly paralleled the narrative with which the Court was
presented in Summum. In 1999, a Buddhist Sherpa asked the
National Park Service to permit the construction of a stupa—a
mound-like structure containing Buddhist relics and serving as a
sacred site of worship—in a location in the Mohave National
77
Preserve near the Latin cross. Citing a regulation that bars any
commemorative installation in a national park area without
78
headquarter’s permission, the Park Service denied the request. In
doing so, the Park Service acknowledged the presence of the cross,
79
and indicated its intention to take it down.
Ultimately, however, the government did not dismantle the
Latin cross. And ultimately, the suit that was brought to challenge
the cross was not a suit by the Buddhists, arguing under the Free
Speech Clause that the public forum should be open to all, but a suit
by an individual offended at the presence of a religious symbol on

71. Id. at 1812.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1822 (Alito, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 1823 (arguing that “removal would have been viewed by many as a sign of
disrespect for the brave soldiers whom the cross was meant to honor”).
75. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114 Stat.
2763A-230 (2001); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-248,
§ 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1551 (2003).
76. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1824 (Scalia, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 1133 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d
1202, 1205–06 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
78. Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
79. Id.
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federal land, arguing under the Establishment Clause that the
symbol must come down.
While characterizing the display as government speech had been
the silver bullet for the municipality in Summum—and presumably
would also have served this purpose for the Park Service if the lawsuit
it had faced was a Free Speech challenge by the Buddhists—that
characterization was a dangerous one in Establishment Clause
litigation. Indeed, when Park Service officials had considered
whether the cross might be preserved by qualifying as a historic place
81
on the National Register, they decided that this was not a
possibility, in part because the cross had been used for religious
82
purposes. That is, the religious character of this speech on
government property was, as a practical matter, impeding the
government’s ability to continue to characterize the expression as
government speech. The incentive to avoid this characterization was
even greater when Frank Buono, a previous assistant superintendent
of the Preserve, filed the lawsuit challenging the cross as a violation
83
of the Establishment Clause.
Thus, in what became the converse of the situation in Summum,
the government took steps to recharacterize the Latin cross
monument from government speech to private speech, again picking
its poison based on the formulation of the suit brought against it.
Congress gave the cross a memorial designation and installed a
plaque specifically noting the sponsorship of the Veterans of Foreign
84
Wars. When a lower federal court held that the Latin cross
85
nevertheless violated the Establishment Clause and the case was
86
appealed and pending before the Ninth Circuit, Congress again
took action, this time even more drastic, to try to recharacterize the
speech from government speech to private speech. In 2004, it
80. Id. at 1207.
81. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007).
82. Id.
83. Mr. Buono, a Roman Catholic, argued standing on the limited grounds that
although he was not offended by a Christian cross or by a religious symbol on government
property, if the site were open to other permanent displays, he would avoid the cross on future
visits to the Preserve because the property was not open in such a way. Salazar v. Buono, 130
S. Ct. 1803, 1827 n.5 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
84. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, §
8137(a), 115 Stat. 2278 (2002).
85. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
86. The Ninth Circuit would also find that the cross violated the Establishment
Clause. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
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ordered the Interior Department to convey the acre of land on
which the cross sits to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in exchange for
87
a parcel of privately owned land of equal or greater value nearby.
Although the bill specifically required that the land revert to federal
ownership if it was no longer maintained as a war memorial, and thus
the government retained at least some control over the message
88
conveyed on the land, Congress plainly wished for the speech to be
viewed as private for purposes of any Establishment Clause analysis.
Buono went back to the district court and asserted the core
argument that ultimately came before the United States Supreme
Court: that the transfer of the property to the private owner was
89
itself invalid under the Establishment Clause. Buono contended
that the transfer was a transparent attempt by Congress to evade the
court ruling against the cross display and to keep the monument in
place, an action that he argued remained a government endorsement
90
91
92
of Christianity. The district court and Ninth Circuit agreed,
finding that the transfer did not end the endorsement and holding
that, “[u]nder the statutory dictates and terms that presently stand,
carving out a tiny parcel of property in the midst of this vast
Preserve—like a donut hole with the cross atop it—will do nothing
93
to minimize the impermissible governmental endorsement.”
The Supreme Court’s decision in Buono was a limited one, and
was delivered through a tangled set of six separate opinions, not one
of which represented a majority. Although a total of five Justices
agreed that the lower courts had erred in barring Congress’s transfer
87. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(a),
117 Stat. 1100 (2004).
88. Id. § 8121(e). Congress did not require that the memorial be a cross, but did
designate the cross as a national memorial before transferring the land. Id. § 8121(a). Justice
Stevens noted that this fact, combined with the government’s retention of a reversionary
interest, and its decision to transfer the land to a private group that had expressed its intent to
keep the cross up, made it so that “[i]f it does not categorically require the new owner of the
property to display the existing memorial meeting that description (the cross), the statute most
certainly encourages this result.” Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1837 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal
citations omitted).
89. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
90. Id. at 1180–81.
91. Id. at 1182 (“[I]t is evident to the court that the government has engaged in
herculean efforts to preserve the Latin Cross on federal land and that the proposed transfer of
the subject property can only be viewed as an attempt to keep the Latin Cross atop Sunrise
Rock without actually curing the continuing Establishment Clause violation by Defendants.”).
92. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 783 (9th Cir. 2008).
93. Id.
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of the plot on which the cross stands to private ownership, the five
did not agree in their reasoning, and only three reached this
94
conclusion on its Establishment Clause merits. Justice Kennedy’s
lead opinion boldly stated that “[t]he goal of avoiding governmental
endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in
the public realm,” and spoke favorably of “Congress’s legislative
judgment that this dispute is best resolved through a framework and
95
policy of accommodation.” However, only Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito joined him on this point. Neither Justice Kennedy’s
position that the message of the cross is not endorsement of
96
religion, nor his apparent position that the posting of a sign
announcing the new private ownership of the property would
97
remedy any possible endorsement are binding precedent going
forward. All told, the Court sent the case back to the district court
98
for closer examination of the action by Congress.
Nevertheless, given the views expressed by Justices Scalia and
Thomas in Summum—and their hints in Buono that they would join
99
Justice Kennedy’s views “in a proper case” —the federal
government might conclude, after Buono, that a future case with a
less peculiar procedural posture might result in five Justices willing to
permit Congress to preserve a religious monument on government
land by transferring to private ownership the immediate plot on
94. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion). Justice
Kennedy was joined in his reasoning in full by Chief Justice Roberts and in part by Justice
Alito. Justice Alito wrote separately to say he agreed with Justice Kennedy on all points except
the decision to remand, arguing that the record was sufficiently developed to allow for
resolution of the issue. Id. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, concurred in the judgment because he believed Buono lacked standing. Id. at 1824
(Scalia, J., concurring). See infra note 98.
95. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1818 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 1816 (“Although certainly a Christian symbol, the cross was not emplaced
on Sunrise Rock to promote a Christian message.”).
97. Id. at 1820 (“Even if, contrary to the congressional judgment, the land transfer
were thought an insufficient accommodation in light of the earlier finding of religious
endorsement, it was incumbent upon the District Court to consider less drastic relief than
complete invalidation of the land-transfer statute. For instance, if there is to be a conveyance,
the question might arise regarding the necessity of further action, such as signs to indicate the
VFW’s ownership of the land.” (internal citations omitted)).
98. Id. at 1819–20. There were four votes in favor of remanding the case for more
consideration, which were supported by two different rationales. There was one vote for
remand but only to vacate the judgment of the court below. Four other Justices opposed the
remand, based on two different analyses. The case does go back to the lower court, because
that is the formal “judgment” of the Court, which received five total votes.
99. Id. at 1828 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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which it stands. While this majority might be willing to reach this
conclusion on the ground that the monument, while remaining
100
government speech, does not endorse religion, the Court might
also achieve the same result by declaring that the transfer of property
changed the character of the speech from government speech to
private speech.
Should the Court take the latter approach, it will signal a serious
practical problem for the new government speech doctrine in the
context of religious displays. In Summum, the government’s efforts
to have potentially private speech classified as government speech
produced the Pyrrhic victory of conceding a critical element of an
101
Establishment Clause claim. Conversely, in the Buono development
just hypothesized, a win for the government on the Establishment
Clause front will not be without consequences on the Free Speech
Clause front. If, for Establishment Clause purposes, the government
successfully recharacterizes its own speech as private speech through
land swaps and signage, the litigants in the next suit—perhaps the
Buddhists who were denied their stupa—would no doubt seek to
take advantage of that characterization in a Free Speech claim.
Indeed, the Buddhists in this hypothetical suit would successfully
allege that the government was doing precisely what Summum had
alleged that Pleasant Grove was doing: opening a public forum for
private speech in the form of an arguably religious display. Once this
forum has been opened to this private speech, the Free Speech
Clause argument will go, the government is constitutionally
obligated to be nondiscriminatory and to allow other private
102
speakers to use the public land for similar expressive purposes.
100. See id. at 1818 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion) (“The goal of avoiding
governmental endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the public
realm. A cross by the side of a public highway marking, for instance, the place where a state
trooper perished need not be taken as a statement of governmental support for sectarian
beliefs. The Constitution does not oblige government to avoid any public acknowledgment of
religion’s role in society.”).
101. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141 (2009) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (arguing that after the Court’s decision, because monuments on government land
will always be viewed as government speech, governments will have to surround arguably
religious monuments on their land with secular objects in order to avoid an Establishment
Clause violation.). Contra id. at 1139–40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the City of
Pleasant Grove had not gone from the “Free Speech Clause frying pan into the Establishment
Clause fire” because under Van Orden the Ten Commandments monument was properly
viewed as a secular rather than religious object).
102. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(holding that the government is free to limit participation in a charity drive to certain
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Indeed, the particular way in which the Park Service endeavored to
restructure the government speech as private speech in Buono could
leave it open to the argument that the Free Speech Clause demands
that the government engage in this complex congressional land
transfer on behalf of every other private entity that would like to
103
have a private plot within the reserve on which to erect its display.
Tellingly, in its string of cases against Utah municipalities based
on Ten Commandments displays and requested Seven Aphorisms
displays, Summum itself has litigated at least one case on precisely
104
this premise. In Summum v. Duchesne City, the sect asked the City
of Duchesne to transfer a small plot of land in a city park to
105
Summum for the display of its monument. It argued that the city
was constitutionally obligated to do so under the Free Speech Clause
because the city had earlier transferred a plot of land in the park
containing a Ten Commandments monument to the Lions Club, a
106
service organization.
As was the case in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, the Buono
Court never squarely addressed the new-found fluidity between
government speech and private speech or the dilemma that might be
presented in the next case if the cause of action were styled
differently. Nevertheless, questions posed at oral argument again
107
hinted at the confusion, and, as described above, the practical
realities of the next case loomed in the background unresolved.
organizations, so long as the limitation is not based on the government’s disagreement with an
organization’s viewpoint); Police Dep’t. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972)
(holding that discriminating between peaceful labor demonstrations and other types of
peaceful demonstrations is unconstitutional).
103. See Tebbe, supra note 16, at 71.
104. 340 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (D. Utah 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 482 F.3d 1263
(10th Cir. 2007), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009) (mem.) (remanding for reconsideration in
light of Pleasant Grove City v. Summum).
105. Id. at 1224.
106. Id. at 1224, 1229 n.13. After a complex line of litigation challenging the validity
of the transfer to the Lions Club and a subsequent transfer back to a family that initially
donated the monument to the city, id. at 1229–30; Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d
1263, 1271 (10th Cir. 2007), the city sought a Writ of Certiorari at the United States
Supreme Court. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (No. 07-690),
2007 WL 4207131. While that petition was pending, the Court issued its opinion in Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum. In response to the petition from Duchesne City, the Court then
vacated the 10th Circuit opinion and remanded for reconsideration in light of Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum. 129 S. Ct. 1523 (mem.). The 10th Circuit remanded to the district court,
from which an opinion has yet to issue. Summum v. Duchesne City, 319 F. App’x 753 (10th
Cir. 2009).
107. For example, Justice Sotomayor questioned how the government would go about
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IV. THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
When placed side by side and played out to their logical
conclusions, Summum and Buono illustrate that the Court has in fact
108
created a “jurisprudence of labels,” that can be expected to rear its
head most prominently and most consistently in the context of
religious displays on government property. The characterization of
property as either government speech or private speech in one First
Amendment litigation context presents practical problems of at least
two varieties—one dealing with the motivations of governmental
entities and the other dealing with the motivations of those who file
suit against them.
First, there is the risk that cities and towns that recognize the
great fluidity between government speech and private speech—and
the benefits that inure from one characterization or the other in a
given litigation context—will argue the characterization that
behooves them in the case at hand, even if that characterization does
not align with their true motivations. The Summum litigants labeled
109
this governmental “subterfuge”;
others have referred to it as
110
government “ventriloquism.” The concern is that a shortsighted
governmental entity will recognize that the Supreme Court has
largely given a free pass in a Free Speech Clause case at the
invocation of the government speech label, or will recognize that the
Court may be on its way to offering a free pass in an Establishment
Clause case with the conveyance of the localized plot of land to
private hands. In either event, the result may be that the government
will invoke one or the other of these doctrines as an artifice when
intending to convey an unconstitutional message. Thus, the
Fraternal Order of Eagles can arrange a “donation” to any
government wishing to convey the message of the Ten
Commandments while excluding the message of other, smaller sects.
Conversely, Congress, through the simple act of a land transfer, can
make the Veterans of Foreign Wars the communicator of the
posting signage identifying the symbol as private speech. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–
25, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472). Justice Stevens probed into the
details of the fraction of the area of the Preserve that is privately held. Id. at 20. This inquiry
may have been motivated, at least in part, by an interest in the property as a forum that might
be opened to private speakers.
108. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1140 (Breyer, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 1134 (majority opinion).
110. Tebbe, supra note 16, at 71.
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message sent by the Latin cross, while still ensuring that the message
111
is conveyed.
Of course, a government would only take this step if it focused
exclusively and myopically on the individual case at hand. Looking
longer-term, it might recognize the risk that the position might pose
to the next round of litigation. This highlights the second, opposite
risk in the form of the potential for plaintiff manipulation.
If, as a practical matter, the surest way for the government to
prevail in a Free Speech case involving arguably religious displays is
to have the display classified as government speech, and the surest
way for the government to prevail in an Establishment Clause case is
to have the display classified as private speech, a plaintiff like
Summum or the Buddhists can force the government to pick its
111. The Court’s apparent willingness to accept that a monument’s message is not
unitary, or even objectively identifiable, adds a level of complexity in this area. Justice Alito’s
opinion for the majority in Summum emphasizes that monuments can mean different things to
different viewers and that the message intended to be conveyed by a private owner may not be
the message adopted by the government taking possession of the display. 129 S. Ct. at 1135
(“The meaning conveyed by a monument is generally not a simple one . . . . Even when a
monument features the written word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted, and
may in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways.”). If the government is
not required to inherit the donor’s message or specify which potential message it is adopting,
the government may be able to classify any monument, even one conveying a message of civic
excommunication immediately before conveyance, Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), as
government speech without fear of subsequent consequences, even if no obvious change was
made to the monument post conveyance. In such circumstances, the city’s response might be
that if the observer senses a message that violates Establishment Clause principles, it is the
donor’s message, not the city’s. Language from Justice Alito’s opinion in Buono, referencing
Summum in recognizing two reasonable interpretations of the meaning of the Latin cross,
suggests his ongoing adherence to this position. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1822
(2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Those humans who made the trip to see the monument
appear to have viewed it as conveying at least two significantly different messages.” (citing
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135 (2009))). This potential free pass
would remove the incentive for the government to strategically classify speech one way or the
other. The government would always have the incentive to classify the speech as government
speech and then to declare that its message was not the donor’s religious message. While
speculation as to the future application of Justice Alito’s indeterminacy theory is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is at least clear that any further development of that theory will have a
profound impact on future government speech/religious monument cases. It suffices for the
purposes of the present analysis to note that a willingness to allow an indeterminacy of the
message being spoken is equally harmful to a neutral rule of law as a willingness to allow an
indeterminacy of the identity of the speaker, the problem addressed here. If the approach
proposed in this Article is adopted, see infra Part V, and the initial inquiry in these cases is
whether the reasonable observer would believe the government or a private speaker was
speaking, then the most consistent approach for the subsequent inquiry would be to inquire
what the reasonable observer would believe the message to be.
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poison. Such a plaintiff could easily bring one losing cause of action
in which the government can be expected to argue a particular
speech classification to ensure its victory, and then use that choice to
the government’s disadvantage in the next case, in which that
112
classification ensures its defeat. Indeed, there appears to be little to
prevent such a plaintiff from simply setting this snare in a single
filing. Organizations like Summum and the Buddhists might easily
assert both a Free Speech Clause claim and an Establishment Clause
113
114
claim in a single suit,
pleading in the alternative
that the
Constitution demands either that the government open the park area
fairly to all comers who wish to engage in private speech or that it
adopt the park speech as its own and then remove all speech that is
religious in character. In such a scenario, absent clarification of the
doctrine from the Court, there is no neutral, unified ground on
115
which to settle the question.
112. The doctrine of judicial estoppel would prohibit the government from denying its
earlier classification of the speech in a future litigation. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S.
742, 749 (2001) (“[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and
succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have
changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has
acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” (alteration in original) (quoting Davis v.
Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895))).
113. See Summum v. City of Ogden, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (D. Utah 2001) (alleging
either Establishment or Free Speech violations), aff’d in part rev’d in part, 297 F.3d 995 (10th
Cir. 2002).
114. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2) (“A party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim
or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or defense or in separate
ones. If a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is
sufficient.”).
115. Justice Alito’s fluidity-of-message reasoning also has implications for this second
problem, which played out in Summum (although again, a detailed analysis of the issue is
beyond the scope of this Article). In Summum, the plaintiff tried to force the government to
pick its poison by arguing that Pleasant Grove needed to formally adopt the message of the
Ten Commandments monument’s donors in order for the monument to qualify as
government speech. 129 S. Ct. at 1134. Theoretically, the next step for Summum would have
been to demonstrate that the government had “established” the religious message it had
formally adopted. If Justice Alito’s comments on message indeterminacy are to be taken
seriously, however, then Summum’s tactics are to no avail. Although the government was
forced to claim the monument as its own speech to avoid a Free Speech issue, the government
did not face an Establishment Clause problem because it could point to a secular message it
intended to speak. Id. at 1130 (noting that the city claimed, in its letter to Summum, to accept
only monuments that have some relationship to the history of the community). If the Court’s
apparent willingness to allow for fluidity of message continues, litigants would have no
incentive to try to force the government to classify the speech as private or government speech.
The government would always choose government speech, because it would be a First
Amendment safe house, making it possible to avoid both Speech and Establishment Clause
issues by claiming that it was speaking its own, secular message, regardless of whether observers
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V. A FIRST STEP TO A COHERENT GOVERNMENT SPEECH
DOCTRINE

To begin to resolve this tangle, the Court must recognize the
inextricable intertwining of the Free Speech Clause and the
Establishment Clause in the context of religious displays, and then
build an organized, workable government speech doctrine with a
lens wide enough to keep the total picture in view.
One initial, important doctrinal step that the Court might take
to bring about this cohesiveness is to clearly adopt—in both the Free
116
Speech and the Establishment Clause arenas—an explicit
“reasonable observer” test. Under such a test, a threshold question
to be asked at the outset of either a Free Speech or an Establishment
Clause case involving an arguably religious display on what is now
(or has recently been) government property would be whether a
believe the message to be religious. Although the issue is worthy of more investigation, the
logical approach would seem to be the adoption of two reasonable observer inquiries—the first
to determine who is speaking and the second to determine what message is being conveyed.
See infra Part V.
116. Some scholars writing post-Summum have argued that the Court has adopted such
a test, albeit implicitly, in that context. See Blocher, supra note 60, at 85 (arguing that it is
possible to view Summum as holding that “no matter what the property owner subjectively
intends—speech occurs where a reasonable observer would think that a property owner’s
acceptance of a monument or other speech act on his property amounts to approval and
communication of its message. And although this viewer-centered approach may incorporate
some notion of property ownership (as Justice Stevens has noted, we generally presume that a
person endorses messages displayed on his property), it is not entirely coincident with the
property-owner-as-speaker approach.”); Tebbe, supra note 16, at 74 (arguing that in Summum
the Court “defended the proposition that permanent monuments on public property
constitute government speech by reference to routine observers” and by so doing “the Court
suggested that it will not simply defer to every private-law arrangement—ownership of the
monument itself is not the only factor that matters when the Court determines who is
speaking. That suggestion will be drawn out and tested in Buono, where the Court will
confront a land transaction that is highly structured, so that ordinary observers may not be able
to associate the message of a permanent monument with the property owner”); Bertagna,
supra note 60, at 59–61 (arguing that the Court had implicitly adopted a “type of
endorsement test” by considering how “an ‘observer’ of a permanent monument on public
property would interpret the relationship between the monument and the government” and
calling for the Court to be more explicit going forward about its employment of an
endorsement-type test in the future, with a focus only on the observers’ knowledge of who
owned the land and the permanence of the monument). But see Roy, supra note 60, at 286
(“The Summum opinion seriously undermines the proposition that a monument sends only
one message or any particular message. . . . [As a result it] seems to exclude the possibility of a
reasonable observer . . . either as an actual person or as a judicial amalgam of a range of
different observers. Indeed, this lengthy discussion of messages creates a nuanced, open-ended
view of the impact on passers-by of public displays that is at odds with the Court’s
jurisprudence applying the endorsement test.”).
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reasonable observer would believe that the government was
speaking, or would instead believe that a private speaker was
conveying the message. This question would be asked prior to, and
apart from, any question about what message was being conveyed,
thereby further neutralizing the inquiry and focusing it on the issue
of who, objectively, seems to be speaking.
Adopting this approach, and assuming the same reasonable
observer in both the Free Speech and the Establishment Clause
contexts, would go a long distance toward resolving the fluidity of
characterization that currently threatens to plague these cases. It
would keep the analytical focus on an objective test, thereby
preventing the arguments from focusing too heavily on who holds
the deed to the particular plot of ground. It also would have the
clear, practical benefit of ensuring that neither the plaintiff’s
litigation strategy nor the government’s potentially disingenuous
characterization of the speech drives the primary analysis.
Such a test presumably would take into account property
ownership, but also would include an inquiry into the reasonable
observer’s awareness of property ownership, the ordinary observer’s
usual proximity from the monument, an investigation of local
assumptions about governmental responsibility for the given
property, and an examination of any ongoing role that the
117
government had in maintaining or supporting the property. Thus,
if a reasonable observer driving through the Mojave National
Preserve knows only that she is traversing a massive national park and
sees a Latin cross perched on an outcropping of rock 100 feet away,
it would matter very little that a clever land deal had conveyed the
immediately surrounding plot to private hands or even that there was
a small sign immediately adjacent to the cross emphasizing its new
private ownership. The reasonable observer would believe that her
government has put a white cross on federal property to convey a
government message, and the existence of a complicated real estate
transaction would make little meaningful difference to the analysis.
Conversely, if a city accepted a donated Ten Commandments
monument but all objective signals suggested to the reasonable
observer that private speakers had control over the display and its
117. See Blocher, supra note 60, at 85 (arguing that, in the Summum situation, the
government speech test should take into account property ownership when determining the
“speaker” of a monument, but should also ask whether the reasonable observer would think
the property owner was speaking the message).
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message, it should be irrelevant that the private speaker had gone
through the motions of “donating” it. Thus, for example, if an
organization executed a nominal donation of a monument bearing
the text of the Ten Commandments, prominently preceded by the
words “Organization X suggests that citizens should obey the
following commandments,” the reasonable observer may well walk
away feeling as if she had been spoken to by the organization, and
not by the city, notwithstanding the city’s technical receipt of a
“donation” within the park. In both instances, the threshold
reasonable-observer test would assume that the reasonable observer’s
view would not be altered by mere changes in form if there were no
meaningful, observable differences in function.
The Court already has taken some small moves in this direction,
laying doctrinal foundations on which this new, cohesive
government speech approach could be built. Both Summum and
Buono contain language that at least implicitly suggests that the
observations of the reasonable person might matter to the
118
government speech inquiry, and the Court has long pointed to the
reasonable-observer standard in the context of the Establishment
119
Clause endorsement test.
118. Justice Alito wrote for the Summum majority that passers-by who observe donated
permanent monuments routinely and reasonably interpret them as conveying some message on
the property owner’s behalf, and that this is true whether the property is private or public
property. 129 S. Ct. at 1133. In Buono, Justice Kennedy indicated that he was not certain that
a reasonable observer test was appropriate to apply to a monument on private land, but went
on to apply it anyway. 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010). And although Justice Alito only
assumed, rather than stated, that the endorsement test could be applied to a monument on
private land, he did use the test to argue essentially that the monument was private speech. Id.
at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Stevens assumed the propriety of a reasonable observer
test throughout his concurrence, arguing that “even assuming . . . that the cross would be
purely private speech after the transfer . . . it would still be appropriate for the District Court to
apply the reasonable observer standard” because “the relevant standard provides that the
Establishment Clause is violated whenever ‘the State’s own actions . . . , and their relationship
to the private speech at issue, actually convey a message of endorsement.’” Id. at 1836–37
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). See also sources cited supra note 116.
119. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 696 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting with disapproval that when the Court analyzes an Establishment Clause challenge to a
religious monument, it “looks for the meaning to an observer of indeterminate religious
affiliation who knows all the facts and circumstances surrounding a challenged display” (citing
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780)); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (“The purpose behind the counties' display is relevant because it conveys an
unmistakable message of endorsement to the reasonable observer.”); Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 34 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the
endorsement test “assumes the viewpoint of a reasonable observer”).
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Significantly, in some Establishment Clause cases it has also
expressed skepticism about after-the-fact alterations to meet this
120
constitutional test. For example, in McCreary County v. ACLU,
the county officials in Kentucky altered their original display, which
had contained only the Ten Commandments, to include other
religiously themed historical documents and then, later, to include
other largely secular documents, like the Magna Carta and the Bill of
121
Rights, displayed alongside the Ten Commandments. The majority
in that case emphasized that “no reasonable observer could swallow
the claim” that these tinkerings with the displays had removed their
122
original religious aim. Although this analysis was asking about the
reasonable observer’s view of the content of the material and whether
it endorsed religion, an identical “reasonable observer” approach
would be equally useful when asking whether original purposes as to
the public or private identity of the speaker were altered through a
donation to or a land transfer from the government.
Further, such a doctrine would also be in keeping with
indications from the Court in other Establishment Clause cases that
mere technicalities or tactical changes in property ownership are not
enough to insulate the government from the Establishment inquiry.
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter the
Court heard a challenge to a nativity scene that was installed in the
123
stairway of a county courthouse. One line of argument on the
government’s part was that the crèche was accompanied by a small
sign indicating that it had been donated by and continued to be
124
owned by a local Catholic group. Notwithstanding this effort—
which in today’s terminology we might label an attempt to have
government speech recharacterized as private speech—the Court
concluded that, based on the perceptions of the reasonable observer,
the principal or primary effect of the display was to advance religion
125
within the meaning of the Lemon test, when the display was viewed
126
in its overall context. Again, that particular use of the reasonableobserver test was focused on the question of what message the
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
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display conveyed—an inquiry that should come subsequent to the
initial question of whether the speech is government or private
speech. But the reasonable-observer inquiry made at the outset of
any case involving arguably government speech should share this
same insistence that neither private nor government speakers may
shift accountability for their speech to others through technicalities
not clearly noticeable to or meaningful for the reasonable observer.
This approach, which puts function over form, would prevent
the Court from giving its blessing to perfectly timed switches in
characterizations of the speech. It also would be consistent with what
the Supreme Court has said is the very premise of the government
speech doctrine. The Court, in crafting the doctrine, has stated that
democratic accountability for speech is the doctrine’s hallmark. That
is, while the Free Speech Clause places significant constraints on
governments when they are managing public fora in which private
speakers are speaking, the government speech doctrine removes
those constraints when the government is speaking, based on the
understanding that “a government entity is ultimately ‘accountable
127
to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy.’” Thus,
if the people object to the government’s speech, they can elect new
representatives who “later could espouse some different or contrary
128
position.” In other words, political accountability, rather than the
Free Speech Clause, will provide the citizenry with its recourse
against the government when the government itself speaks in ways
with which the citizenry disapproves. This premise presupposes that
governments will accept responsibility for messages that are
objectively theirs and that this accountability will be determined
through the eyes of a reasonable observer, not via a label affixed by
the government or a private party with a vested interest in the
message conveyed by the display.
Adopting the reasonable-observer approach will not, of course,
eliminate either the government or the plaintiff’s incentives to
strategize. Both parties will endeavor to demonstrate that the
governing test is met in their favor. Ultimately, in monument cases,
the poison will have to be picked, because a monument will either be
private or government speech, and consequences will flow from
either outcome. However, a reasonable-observer test would at least
127. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2005) (quoting Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).
128. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235.
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ensure that the picking happens in the same way in all instances,
rather than at the whim of litigants or the caprice of the Court. The
power of litigation choice can be neutralized on both sides by
establishing a principled, more predictable way of distinguishing
private and government speech, irrespective of the government’s
complicated real estate transactions or other would-be antidotal
tinkerings. Equally as significant, by making this foundational inquiry
identical regardless of which case is brought first, the approach will
place the deciding court in a more neutral, objective position and
will demand that it view the Establishment and Free Speech issues as
inextricably related to one another. Not only will the reasonableobserver approach facilitate political accountability—because citizens
will be able to credit the speech to the right speaker and react
accordingly—it also will build a cohesive, rather than piecemeal,
approach to the relationship between the two clauses as applied to
monuments, something the Court has thus far refused to provide.
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